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NOTES
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles: Compensation for Temporary Takings
A church owned a retreat center and recreational area for handicapped
children. The buildings at the retreat center were destroyed by a flood
in 1978. The county where the property was located adopted an ordinance
which temporarily prohibited any construction or reconstruction in the
"interim flood protection area" until flood control measures could be
implemented. The church's property fell within the protection area, and
therefore the ordinance prohibited any reconstruction of the retreat
center. The county justified the ordinance as necessary "for the im-
mediate preservation of the public health and safety" and made it
effective immediately upon adoption.'
One month after the ordinance was adopted, the church filed suit
against the county. Alleging that the prohibition on reconstruction de-
prived the church of all use of its property, the church sought monetary
damages in inverse condemnation for loss of use. The trial court granted
the county's motion to strike part of the allegations on the grounds
that monetary damages are not available as a remedy for land use
regulations that violate the taking clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 2 The California Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
decision, and the California Supreme Court denied review. The United
States Supreme Court reversed. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
The Supreme Court held that the church was entitled to the op-
portunity to prove the damage claim. If the church could establish that
the county's ordinance amounted to a taking within the meaning of the
fifth amendment, then it had to be compensated for the time during
which the "taking was effective." 3 One implication of this holding is
the Court's approval of a monetary damages remedy for excessive land
use regulations that violate the taking clause before being judicially
declared unconstitutional.
The opinion carefully restricts its holding to a situation where a
regulation deprives the landowner of all beneficial use, but numerous
questions remain unanswered. Logically, the damages remedy should
Copyright 1988, by LOUSiANA LAW REVIEW.
1. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2381-82 (1987).
2. Id. at 2382.
3. Id. at 2389.
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apply to all types of regulatory takings. Are there regulatory takings
that do not deprive the landowner of all beneficial use of his property?
How should damages be calculated for a temporary taking? When do
damages begin to accrue? Will the imposition of a damages remedy
have any effect on the formulation of regulatory policy at the municipal
level? Will the effects of the remedy be desirable?
This note explores the constitutional and practical implications of
the First English holding and addresses the questions summarized above.
It begins by examining the background of the jurisprudence concerning
regulatory and temporary takings. An analysis of First English follows.
The concluding section examines the implications of the decision and
the criticisms that have been lodged against the damages remedy in
taking cases.
BACKGROUND OF TAKINGS
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that the federal government may take private property only for public
use and only upon providing "just compensation." '4 This restriction
applies to state governments and their agencies through the fourteenth
amendment.5 There are at least three ways in which a land use regulation
might deprive a person of the rights granted and protected by these two
amendments. First, the process by which the regulation is enforced may
deprive the landowner of procedural due process rights. Second, a reg-
ulation may deprive him of substantive economic due process rights.
Finally, a regulation may deprive a property owner of ownership rights
to the extent that the regulation is identified as a taking of property.
In early land use regulation cases, the court was mainly concerned
with procedural fairness. 6 One early opinion went so far as to say "it
is not possible to hold that a party has without due process of law,
been deprived of his property, when . . . he has, by the laws of the
State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of
proceeding applicable to such a case." 7 But near the turn of the century,
4. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. Const. amend. V.
5. "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897), is cited in the modern taking cases as incorporating
the compensation clause into the fourteenth amendment.
6. 2 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak, J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance
and Procedure § 15.11 at 129.
7. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877).
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the court began to examine the 'substance' as well as the form of
such a taking," holding that the due process clause required that the
property be taken for public use and that compensation be paid.'
The United State Supreme Court has long recognized that a tem-
porary physical occupation and use of private property by the government
is a taking within the meaning of the just compensation clause of the
fifth amendment. 9 During the 1940's, the Court recognized that the
appropriation and use of private property by the United States govern-
ment during World War II was a taking, and therefore the property
owners were entitled to compensation even though the taking was tem-
porary. In these cases, the government occupation and use occurred
during specific time periods. As a result, the beginning and the end of
the taking was easily established, and the main problem for the Court
was determining the proper measure of damages.' 0 As originally con-
ceived, the concept of a taking probably included only physical appro-
priation, invasion and use." Today, it is clear that "non-acquisitive
governmental action may amount to a taking in a constitutional sense."' 2
A regulatory taking claim is an action for relief that is based on
the contention that the effect of a regulation is unconstitutional because
it deprives the complainant of his property without compensating him
for his loss. These claims arise because an exercise of police power,
such as a land use regulation or other type of restriction, 3 can exceed
a constitutional limit.' 4 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,5 Justice
Holmes in a now famous and oft-quoted passage declared that "if a
8. Chicago, B & Q R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 234-35, 17 S. Ct. at 583-84. See also
Rotunda, supra note 6, § 15.11 at 129.
9. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 65 S. Ct. 1434 (1949); United
States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 S. Ct. 596 (1946); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 655 S. Ct. 357 (1945).
10. Kimball Landry, 338 U.S. at 4-21, 69 S. Ct. at 1437-45; Petty Motor, 327 U.S.
at 377-81, 66 S. Ct. at 599-601; General Motors, 323 U.S. at 379-84, 65 S. Ct. at 360-
62.
11. 2 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak, J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance
and Procedure § 15.12 at 130.
12. Id.
13. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978)
(preservation of landmarks); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S. Ct.
987 (1962) (prohibition on mining below water table); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926) (zoning ordinance); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 8 S. Ct. 273 (1887) (prohibition on the manufacture of beer).
14. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979) (limitation
on owner's right to exclude others found unconstitutional); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 48 S. Ct. 447 (1928) (zoning ordinance found unconstitutional as applied);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) (Pennsylvania
statute regulating the mining of coal found unconstitutional).
15. 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922).
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regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."16 Unfortunately,
he did not define precisely what he meant by "too far." Several com-
mentators have stated that Justice Holmes felt that the "distinction
between a taking and regulation is one of degree"' 7 and that "the police
power and eminent domain exist in a continuum."' 8 Therefore, Holmes
concluded, each case must be decided on its "particular facts."' 9
In the 65 years since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has found itself
unable to develop a "set formula" for determining which land use
regulations are so excessive as to constitute a taking. 20 One reason for
the Court's failure is that different types of regulations produce different
types of adverse effects. For each different effect, some threshhold limit
must be established beyond which a regulation will be recognized as a
taking. A regulation that results in a permanent physical occupation is
per se a taking regardless of the size or quantity of space that is
occupied. 2' In an analogous way, a regulation that deprives the landowner
of all, or substantially all, of the value or use of his property constitutes
a taking. 22 These two tests measure similar effects. If a part of the
property is physically occupied, then the owner is deprived of all use
of that space.
In addition to takings claims, land use regulations are also subject
to a second form of constitutional attack. If a landowner's use of or
value in the property is only hindered or restricted, without physical
invasion and occupation, and the effect is something less than a dep-
rivation of all use or value, then the approach has been to use a
substantive due process balancing test. Like all private property regu-
lations, they must satisfy the minimal requirements of the due process
clause. This constitutional standard requires a court to consider the
public interest, the means chosen to achieve the goal, and the economic
effect on the landowner, but it provides only a minimum level of judicial
scrutiny. 21 In order to justify an uncompensated diminution in the value
of a person's property, the governmental body imposing the regulation
must show that there is a legitimate purpose for the regulation and that
the regulation bears a rational relationship to the accomplishment of
16. Id. at 415, 43 S. Ct. at 160.
17. Rotunda, supra note 7, § 15.12, at 132.
18. Id. at 133.
19. 260 U.S. at 413, 43 S. Ct. at 159.
20. Justice Brennan admitted this in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S. Ct. at
2659.
21. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164
(1982); see also Rotunda, supra note 8, § 15.12, at 139-40.
22. Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 165, 175-
77 (1974).
23. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S. Ct. at 2659.
[Vol. 48
NOTES
that goal or purpose. Generally, if there is a legitimate state purpose
and if "the means chosen are reasonably necessary to the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals," then the
regulation does not constitute a taking.24 Courts have held that regu-
lations may destroy or adversely affect "recognized real property
interests" 25 and may prohibit the most beneficial use of the property
when the public interest is sufficiently strong. 26 Therefore, the greater
the economic injury to the landowner, the stronger the public interest
required to avoid violating the due process clause.
To evaluate the extent of the landowner's injury, the court determines
whether the regulation unduly "frustrates distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations. ' 27 In the interest of fairness and economic efficiency, an
individual who purchases property with the intent to develop should not
be unduly penalized by regulations imposed after the purchase and which
the purchaser did not expect and could not have foreseen prior to the
purchase. It is desirable for decision-makers to possess all relevant
information before an investment decision is made. 28 When a developer
purchases a particular piece of property, there is a given set of as-
sumptions reflected in the purchase price. An expectation of future use
restrictions would result in a lower purchase price than if there were
no expected future use restrictions.
If the government knew that it would be required to pay compen-
sation in order to impose a particular use restriction, then it would
weigh more carefully the expected benefits that should result from the
new regulation. In other words, the compensation that must be paid to
24. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590, 595, 82 S. Ct. 987, 990 (1962). (quoting Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137, 14 S. Ct. 499, 501 (1894)).
25. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125, 98 S. Ct. at 2659.
26. Id. at 127, 98 S. Ct. at 2660. See also Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S. Ct. 987
(1962); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273 (1887).
27. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127, 98 S. Ct. at 2661. The Supreme Court appeared
to use a two-part inquiry in weighing the merits of Penn Central's claim. The Court had
first decided that the regulation in question was not invalid because the City's objective
was neither arbitrary nor unconstitutionally discriminatory.
The second inquiry was "whether the interference with appellants property is of such
a magnitude that 'there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain [it].' Id. at 136, 98 S. Ct. at 2665. The opinion stated that the answer to this
question depends on the "severity of the impact of the law on appellants' parcel." Id.
The Court held that compensation was not required because Penn Central was not precluded
from obtaining a "reasonable return" on its investment, was not precluded from all
beneficial use of their property, and because Penn Central's losses were mitigated by the
right under New York zoning regulations to transfer their development rights to nearby
parcels which they also owned. Id. at 130-37, 98 S. Ct. 2661-66.
28. Berger, supra note 22, at 197-98.
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the landowner will be considered in light of the expected benefits that
would accrue to the public. This should insure that the benefits from
the new regulation will meet or exceed the costs of the sacrificed de-
velopment plus the cost of compensation. Compensation provides a
mechanism by which the costs of the regulation are distributed to the
public in general and not borne by individual landowners. 29
In determining the extent of economic injury, the "nature of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole" is also important.30
The regulation cases differ from the physical occupation cases in one
important respect. A regulation that completely destroys the value in
only one part or segment of the property or only one right or privilege
associated with ownership, does not, thereby, automatically constitute
a taking. Property rights are viewed as an aggregate and "where an
owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of
one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must
be viewed in its entirety."'"
Since each regulatory taking claim must be decided on a case-by-
case basis, difficulties arise in determining when a taking by regulation
occurs and, in the case of temporary takings, whether a taking has
occurred at all.3 2 Because each case must be decided on its own facts,
it has been argued that a regulation that has violated the due process
clause is not a taking and, therefore, not compensable until a court has
determined that a taking has occurred and the regulating authority has
decided to keep the regulation in force. However, the regulation may
have reduced the value of the property to such an extent that the
landowner has suffered adverse economic effects sufficient to find that
the regulation constituted a taking even before the regulation is declared
29. Id. at 216-18.
30. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31, 98 S. Ct. at 2662. See, e.g., Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1248 (1987); Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 65-66, 100 S. Ct. 318, 326-27 (1979).
31. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66, 100 S. Ct. at 326-27.
32. Indeed government announcements that a particular parcel of property will be
acquired at a future time through eminent domain proceedings can drastically reduce the
value of the property between the date of the announcement and the date on which the
property is acquired. To avoid this problem the Court has held that if the decline in
market value is "substantial and unforeseeable" then the landowner should be compensated
for the adverse economic effects of an announced governmental intention to condemn
the property. Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 2187
(1984). This case also holds that if there is a significant change in the value of the
property between the time of the taking and the tender of payment by the government
then interest must be paid on the value of the property from the date of the taking. See
also Rotunda, supra note 8, § 15.14, at 152. Generally, the courts value the land at its
"highest and best use."
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invalid by a court.33 But generally, diminutions in value due to gov-
ernment planning activities do not implicate the just compensation clause
unless the purpose of the regulation is to depress land prices and thereby
reduce the future costs of condemnation. 4
Between 1928 and 1962, the United States Supreme Court largely
abstained from consideration of regulatory taking claims involving state
and local governments." As a result, state courts developed much of
the jurisprudence concerning remedies and did not necessarily apply
federal constitutional standards.36 The states have disagreed widely on
the question of the proper remedy. 7 While actions in inverse
condemnation 8 for damages have always been allowed in physical in-
trusion and occupation cases, this is not true of the regulatory taking
cases. Arizona, California, and Connecticut allow only actions for man-
damus or declaratory relief, limiting the remedy to an invalidation of
the unconstitutional regulation. 39 Six states allow actions for invalidation
as well as for damages.40 Three states allow a damages remedy only
33. Berger, supra note 22, at 216-18.
34. Justice Holmes wrote that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413, 43 S. Ct. at 159. See also
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 60 S. Ct. 231 (1939) (legislation requiring future
condemnation not a taking); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138
(1980) (city preliminary planning activities do not constitute a taking).
35. Rotunda, supra note 11, § 15.12, at 135.
36. Id.
37. Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages
Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 717-19 (1982).
38. Inverse condemnation is defined as "[a] cause of action against a government
agency to recover the value of property taken by the agency, though no formal exercise
of the power of eminent domain has been completed." Black's Law Dictionary 740 (5th
ed. 1979). The theory is that the aggrieved landowner whose property has been taken by
the government is afforded the opportunity to force the government to buy those rights
of which he has been deprived.
39. Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 345, 590 P.2d 459, 461, (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 942, 99 S. Ct. 2885 (1978); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266,
276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377-78 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542
P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 1495 (1975); DeMello
v. Town of Plainville, 170 Conn. 675, 368 A.2d 71 (1976).
40. Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981); Clifton v. Berry,
244 Ga. 78, 259 S.E.2d 35 (1979); Village of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St.
2d 39, 278 N.E.2d 658, cert. denied, sub nom. Chongris v. Lorrigan, 409 U.S. 919, 93
S. Ct. 218 (1972); Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 44 Md. App. 79, 418 A.2d 1155,
(1980), cert. denied, 449 US. 1083, 101 S. Ct. 869 (1981); City of Austin v. Teague, 570
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978).
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under certain circumstances.4 1 For example, Colorado allows a damages
remedy when cumulative administrative conduct works a taking. 42 Florida
and Minnesota allow a damages remedy when invalidation cannot provide
an effective remedy. 43 North Dakota allows a damages remedy when
the regulation denies all beneficial use of the property.44 The Texas
Supreme Court allowed damages when the City of Austin repeatedly
denied development permits. 45 In most cases where a damages remedy
is not available, state courts have given the government the option of
either rescinding the offending regulation or paying compensation to
keep the regulation in force.
46
The federal courts have been hesitant to declare federal regulations
invalid when important public policies might be hindered.4 7 Also, the
Tucker Act 4s is viewed as a "congressional authorization for the payment
of compensation when federal government activities damage private prop-
erty rights." 49 For these reasons, the federal courts have been receptive
to requests for compensatory relief from federal regulations. The question
that remained was whether there was a federal constitutional basis for
a damages remedy in an action for relief from an excessive regulation
against state and local governments.5 0
41. Hermanson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 42 Colo. App. 154, 595 P.2d 694
(1979); Moviematic Industries Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); Minch v. City of Fargo, 297 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1980); Keystone Assocs. v.
State, 39 A.D.2d 176, 333 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254,
352 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973).
42. Hermanson, 42 Colo. App. 154, 595 P.2d 694 (1979).
43. Gables-By-The-Sea, 333 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), Holoway v. City
of Pipestone, 269 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1978).
44. Minch, 297 N.W.2d 785.
45. City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Tex. 1978).
46. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979),
rev'd in part sub nom. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981);
Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979).
47. Comment, supra note 37, at 720. See also infra notes 54-58 and accompanying
text.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 1987) in part reads:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any claims against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or
any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unli-
quidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
49. Comment, supra note 37, at 720.
50. There is a statutory basis for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lynch v. Household
Finance Co., 405 U.S. 538, 543, 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1117 (1972), established that Congress
intended to provide a federal forum for the redress of wrongful deprivation of property
rights by persons acting under color of state law. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), held that municipal corporations are persons for purposes
of this statute.
NOTES
The California Supreme Court refused to allow a damages remedy
in Agins v. City of Tiburon." The plaintiffs were seeking damages in
inverse condemnation partly on the basis that they were deprived of all
beneficial use of their property during the pendency of eminent domain
proceedings.5 2 The trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the
California Supreme Court had previously indicated that declaratory relief
was the proper and appropriate remedy where a landowner sought relief
from a land use regulation."
The California Supreme Court upheld the dismissal arguing that
monetary damages were not a desirable or appropriate remedy for two
reasons. First, it would be an improper and undesirable usurpation of
legislative power for a court to order a state or local government to
purchase property rights simply because a regulation was declared un-
constitutional. The choice of purchasing the effected property rights or
rescinding the regulation should be a matter of public policy and properly
belongs to the legislature.
5 4
Second, the court was concerned that the availability of an inverse
condemnation remedy "would have a chilling effect upon the exercise
of police regulatory powers at a local level because the expenditure of
public funds would be, to some extent, within the power of the judi-
ciary." 55 Fear that the public fisc would be injured by successful reg-
ulatory taking claims would deter local land use planners from
implementing strict regulations. State and local legislative bodies would
lose control over expenditures and financial planning would be difficult
if not impossible.
The California court's legal argument was that a regulation which
deprived the landowner of all use and enjoyment of his property but
51. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979). Plaintiffs were the
owners of five acres of unimproved but very desirable real estate. The City of Tiburon
adopted an ordinance pursuant to a general comprehensive plan that limited the owners'
development plans to the construction of not more than five single family dwellings. The
City instituted and then abandoned eminent domain proceedings while leaving the ordinance
in force. The plaintiffs were given $4500.00 for their legal expenses that resulted from
the eminent domain proceedings. Not satisfied, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the
ordinance constituted an unconstitutional taking of their property, and they asked for
declaratory relief and $2 million damages in inverse condemnation.
52. Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
53. State of California v. Superior Court 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281,
115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974).
54. The Court believed that the decision to purchase property rights involves a
comparison of the cost to purchase and the public benefits received as a result of that
acquisition. Such policy decisions are the province of the legislature and not the judiciary.
Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
55. Id.
1988]
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did not provide for compensation was an invalid exercise of eminent
domain. It was unreasonable, perhaps arbitrary, and an invalid exercise
of police power. Such a regulation thus violated the due process clause,
and judicially ordered compensation could not constitutionally rehabil-
itate the regulation. The landowner may not convert "an excessive use
of the police power into a lawful taking" by suing for monetary relief
through inverse condemnation proceedings. 6 Therefore, the only rem-
edies available to the landowner were mandamus and declaratory relief.
Carried to its logical conclusion, this line of reasoning implies that
an excessive or arbitrary regulation that violates the due process clause
can never amount to a taking for which compensation must be paid
if due process violations and taking clause violations are kept separate
and distinct. It also implies that a land use regulation that violates the
due process clause should only be compensated through section 1983 of
Title 42 of the United States Code. 7
This argument rests on the theory that Justice Holmes was speaking
metaphorically in Pennsylvania Coal when he referred to excessive re-
gulations as takings. Some of Justice Holmes' opinions which pre-date
Pennsylvania Coal state that an overly restrictive regulation does not
trigger an award of compensation, but is merely invalid." In other
words, Holmes did not mean that excessive regulations would fall within
the scope of the just compensation clause. He merely used the word
"taking" as a "shorthand symbol for the outer limit to valid exercises
of the police power, beyond which point the government would have
to resort to its eminent domain power to achieve its objective." 5 9 This
approach also formed the basis of the New York Court of Appeals
opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York.60
56. 24 Cal. 3d at 273, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordiance, regulation, custom, or
usuage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, priviledges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
In Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), the United
States Supreme Court held that municipalities are persons for purposes of this statute.
58. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156, 41 S. Ct. 458, 459 (1921); Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355, 28 S. Ct. 529, 531 (1908); Martin v. District
of Columbia, 205 U.S. 135, 139, 27 S. Ct. 440, 441 (1907).
59. Comment, supra note 35, at 714. See also Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), where the Court
included a description of this theory in the opinion but declined to comment on its validity
because the claim was premature.
60. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
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In Agins, the California Supreme Court also rejected the plaintiff's
taking claim on the merits. The landowners were not entitled to de-
claratory relief because the regulation did not deprive them of all ben-
eficial use of the land, nor did it "impermissibly decrease" the value
of the property. 6' On appeal, the United States Supreme Court avoided
the remedial issue by upholding the California Supreme Court's ruling
that a taking had not occurred. 62
The year after the Supreme Court's affirmance in Agins, Justice
Brennan argued for a damages remedy in his dissent in San Diego Gas
& Electric Co. v. San Diego.63 The utility company was seeking damages
in inverse condemnation for an alleged regulatory taking, but the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court denied the request in light of Agins. The utility
company appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that
California could not limit the remedy to mandamus or declaratory relief.
The appeal was dismissed because the Court found that there had been
no final judgment. 64
Justice Brennan disagreed, finding that the California court's denial
of monetary relief did indeed constitute a final judgment. 65 In the
dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan proposed a constitutional basis for
a damages remedy for a temporary regulatory taking. He rejected the
state court holdings in Agins and Penn Central66 that an invalid exercise
of police power could not constitute a taking under federal constitutional
law. 6 1 Justice Brennan wrote:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other
land-use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty in order to promote the public good just as effectively as
formal condemnation or physical invasion of property .... It
is only logical, then, that government action other than acqui-
sition of title, occupancy, or physical invasion can be a 'taking',
and therefore a de facto exercise of the power of eminent
61. 24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal, Rptr. at 378.
62. 447 U.S. 255, 261, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142 (1980). 63. 450 U.S. 621, 101 S.
62. 447 U.S. 255, 261, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142 (1980).
63. 450 U.S. 621, 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981). In this case, the property owner's land was
rezoned by the city, effectively preventing the utility from using the property for the pur-
pose for which it was purchased. The property owner sought mandamus and declaratory
relief as well as damages for inverse condemnation.
64. Id. at 630, 101 S. Ct. at 1293.
65. Id. at 645, 101 S. Ct. at 1300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. The New York Court of Appeals had come to the same conclusion. Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 329, 397 N.Y.S. 2d 914, 917, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (1977). That court held that there could be no taking since the regulation
had not transferred control of the property to the city, but had only imposed a negative
restriction on the use of the property.
67. San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 647, 101 S. Ct. 1302.
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domain, where the effects completely deprive the owner of all
or most of his interest in the property.
68
This language implies that a regulation may satisfy the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause because it promotes a permissible public goal
and yet still be an unconstitutional taking because it has significant
adverse economic effects on the landowner. If this analysis is plausible,
then the public would benefit during the interim period between the
date on which the regulation takes effect and the date on which the
regulation is rescinded or the government acquires the property through
condemnation. The public should bear the costs of those benefits and
the landowner should be compensated in order to place him in the same
position, monetarily, as if his property had not been subjected to the
regulation.
As recently as 1977, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a land use
regulation could amount to a taking. 69 This holding in turn forms the
basis for the proposition that compensation must be paid for the period
during which such a regulation causes a taking. On its face, the just
compensation clause does not distinguish between permanent and tem-
porary takings.70 On the other hand, the clause does not require a
governmental entity to acquire property merely because a regulation has
been declared invalid. The government would retain the option either
to rescind the offending regulation and pay compensation for the interim
period during which the regulation "effected a taking' '7 or to condemn
the property formally, to pay the full market value, and to continue
the regulation in effect. 72
A majority of the court endorsed Justice Brennan's approach in
Agins and San Diego." Prior to the advent of First English, four cases
had attempted to bring the remedial issue to the court for resolution.
Each time the question arose, the Court refused to consider it because
either the appeal was not from a final judgment or the regulation in
question did not amount to a taking. 74
68. Id. at 652-53, 101 S. Ct. at 1304.
69. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
70. Id. at 657, 101 S. Ct. at 1307.
71. Id. at 659-60, 101 S. Ct. at 1307-08.
72. Id. at 659-60, 101 S. Ct. at 1308.
73. Justice Brennan was joined in his dissent by Justice Stewart, Justice Marshall,
and Justice Powell. Id. at 636, 101 S. Ct. at 1296. In a separate concurrence Justice
Rehnquist indicated that, but for the lack of a final judgment, he also would have
endorsed Justice Brennan's approach. Id. at 633-34, 101 S. Ct. at 1294-95.
74. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 106 S. Ct. 2561
(1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 101 S.
Ct. 1287 (1981). Agins, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
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THE First English Opinion
In First English, the Court finally addressed the substantive issue
that it had avoided in previous decisions. In its complaint, the church
alleged that the challenged ordinance denied it all use of its property
and sought to recover monetary damages in inverse condemnation. The
trial judge granted the defendant's motion to strike the allegations,
relying on a procedural statutev5 and the rule in Agins. The reasoning
was that since Agins prohibited an inverse condemnation remedy in an
action for relief from a land use regulation, then the allegations had
no bearing on any possible cause of action. The allegation was deemed
"immaterial and irrelevant" because the church sought only damages.
By relying on the Agins rule, the trial court isolated the remedial
issue for review. 76 The California Court of Appeals, also relying on
Agins, upheld the trial court's decision, and the California Supreme
Court denied review. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court
agreed to review the state court decision. Since the church sought only
monetary damages and had appealed the trial court's decision to grant
the motion to strike and, since there had been no trial on the merits
of the taking claim, the remedial issue was isolated from any issue
relating to the merits of the church's claim. The sole issue before the
Court was whether "the Just Compensation Clause requires the gov-
ernment to pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings. 77
The United States Supreme Court's analysis was based on traditional
constitutional interpretation. First, the constitutional guarantee of com-
pensation for property taken by a government entity is "self-executing. 78
Stated another way, "[tlhe form of the remedy cannot qualify the
right." ' 79 The right to compensation is absolute once it has been deter-
mined that a taking has occurred. s0 Constitutional guarantees cannot be
limited or restricted by procedural limitations imposed by a state or the
federal government. Since suits for compensation are founded on the
75. Section 436 of the California Code of Civil Procedure (West Supp. 1988) states
"It]he court may .. . [sitrike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in
any pleading."
76. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2382.
77. Id. at 2385.
78. Id. at 2386 (quoting United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S. Ct. 1127,
1130 (1980)).
79. 107 S. Ct. at 2386 (quoting Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16, 54 S. Ct.
26, 27 (1933)).
80. See also Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5, 104 S. Ct
2187, 2191 (1984); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 1068
(1946); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304-06, 43 S. Ct.
354, 355-56 (1923); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327,
13 S. Ct. 622, 626 (1893).
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Constitution of the United States, no statute can interfere with the
seeking of compensation.
The second basis for the decision was Justice Holmes' proposition
in Pennsylvania Coal that a regulation that "goes too far" will be
"recognized as a taking.''" The opinion repeated the well established
principle that a regulation may be so excessive as to amount to a taking.
Furthermore, a taking may occur before the regulation is declared invalid
by a court. The Court rejected the argument that the language of
Pennsylvania Coal should be narrowly construed so as to limit the
application of the just compensation clause to cases involving physical
occupation and use by a government entity.8 2 The Court stated that the
Agins decision "truncated" this rule "by disallowing damages that oc-
curred prior to the ultimate invalidation of the challenged regulation." 3
The opinion carefully delineates the scope of its holding. It states
that compensation must be paid from the time that the regulation
"effects a taking." '8 4 Furthermore, the holding is explicitly limited to a
situation where the landowner is denied all use of his property by a
regulation and does not "deal with the quite different questions that
would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not
before us." 85
First English only teaches that if the effects of a regulation are
sufficiently excessive so that a taking results, and if the regulation
achieves this status prior to a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality,
then the government entity that imposed the regulation must compensate
the landowner who was adversely effected. Therefore, in the future,
courts must determine not only whether a taking has occurred, but also
the point at which the taking began to occur.
IMPLICATIONS
Apparently, most of the formal doctrine concerning regulatory tak-
ings remains unchanged after First English. The opinion implies that
since there is no constitutional basis for a distinction between temporary
and permanent regulatory takings, then temporary regulatory taking
claims are to be determined by the same standards that are applied to
permanent regulatory taking claims. This suggests that there has been
81. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160 (1922).
82. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386-87.
83. Id. at 2387.
84. Id. at 2389. Similar language appears in Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego
Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. 621, 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
85. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
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no change in the rules by which regulatory taking claims have been
adjudged.
The opinion reaffirms the prior jurisprudence, which holds that the
mere adoption of a regulation is not sufficient to support a taking claim.
Regulatory taking claims have been brought on the grounds that the
enactment of a regulation or governmental planning activity which re-
duced the market value of a parcel of property constituted a taking.86
The Court has consistently recognized that such fluctuations in value
are "incidents of ownership" and therefore do not constitute takings
unless the landowner is deprived of all economically viable uses of his
property, or unless the purpose of the enactment or activity was to
reduce the value of the property in order to reduce the amount of
compensation that must be paid when the property is formally con-
demned .87
Realistically, however, the injection of a temporal factor into the
regulatory takings analysis may have changed the analysis for the future.
The Court may be ready to recognize new grounds for finding a reg-
ulatory taking. As mentioned earlier, some state courts have allowed a
damages remedy in inverse condemnation for takings that resulted from
unjustified administrative delay and misconduct and from repeated denial
of development permits, as well as from denial of all beneficial use of
the property.18 During the 65 years since Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme
Court reviewed only a few of the numerous state court decisions. Mean-
while, the state courts have sometimes interpreted the Constitution or
their own state constitutions more strictly,8 9 thereby widening the bases
for regulatory taking claims. The recent increase in the number of
regulatory taking claims reviewed by the Supreme Court indicates that
the Court might be prepared to revive the takings clause. If so, then
the Court can turn to the large body of firmly entrenched state court
jurisprudence for guidance.
86. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980); Danforth v.
United States, 308 U.S. 271, 60 S. Ct. 231 (1939).
87. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9, 109 S. Ct. at 2143 n.9; Danforth, 308 U.S. at
285, 60 S. Ct. at 236; Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413, 43 S. Ct. at 159.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
89. For example, in cases where overflights have significantly decreased the value of
a piece of property, federal courts have declined to award compensation unless the
overflights actually penetrated the airspace over the claimant's property. Griggs v. County
of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S. Ct. 531 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962). However,
two state courts have awarded damages based on a "taking" caused by overflights that
did not actually penetrate the airspace above the claimant's property. Thornburg v. Port
of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d
309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989, 85 S. Ct. 701 (1965).
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There are sound policy reasons why the Court should adopt a stricter
application of the takings clause. Land use regulation has become per-
vasive. Proponents of the damages remedy for temporary regulatory
takings have argued that First English will provide the means to curb
what they perceive to be abuses of the police power and land use
planning schemes. The lack of a damages remedy for temporary reg-
ulatory takings encouraged government entities to enact the most strin-
gent regulations possible. If a successful challenge was brought and the
landowner obtained declaratory relief, then the government entity would
enact a similar but slightly different regulation that achieved the same
effect. The landowner had to then institute new legal proceedings to
challenge the new regulation. As a result, the government entity could
forestall the development of certain property indefinitely while avoiding
the necessity of formally condemning the property and paying compen-
sation.9 It has been argued that the damages remedy will not only
prevent this abuse but will also encourage land use planners to more
carefully weigh the costs and benefits of land use regulations and create
more economically efficient regulations. 9'
Some commentators have argued that compensation for temporary
regulatory takings will damage municipal treasuries and deter munici-
palities from enacting stringent land use regulations.9 2 The availability
of a damages remedy will expose municipalities to unexpected, and
possibly severe, liability to landowners who bring successful regulatory
taking claims. 93 The California Supreme Court in Agins recognized that
state and local budgets already strained by federal budget cuts could
90. Indeed this procedure was even recommended by a prominent California city
attorney:
If all else fails, merely amend the regulation and start over again. If legal
preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a claim attacking
the land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose, don't worry about it.
All is not lost. One of the extra 'goodies' contained in the recent [California]
Supreme Court case of Selby v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110,
109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111, appears to allow the City to change the
regulation in question, even after trial and judgment, make it more reasonable,
more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts over again .... See how
easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the battle and still
win the war. Good luck.
San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 655-56 n.22, 101 S. Ct. at 1306 n.22 (quoting
Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations (In-
cluding Inverse Condemnation), 38B NIMLO Municipal L. Rev. 192-93 (1975)).
91. Comment, supra note 37, at 731-32. See also Sterk, Government Liability for
Unconstitutional Land Use Regulation, 60 Ind. L. J. 113, 146-57.
92. Comment, supra note 37, at 726-32.
93. The damages requested by the utility in San Diego Gas & Electric were over
three million dollars. 450 U.S. at 627, 101 S. Ct. at 1291.
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be severely disrupted by large damage awards. 94 For this reason, state
and local regulatory authorities may be reluctant to expose themselves
to potentially severe damages liability by enacting a regulation that comes
close to the constitutional limit of the police power. Since that limit is
not clearly defined, planners will be wary of regulations that approach
what they perceive to be the constitutional limit. As a result, enacted
regulations may be less strict than constitutionally possible, and the
public will be denied the benefits of more stringent regulations. Fur-
thermore, where strict regulations are imposed, First English may make
government entities less willing to fight a landowner's challenge and
more willing to settle out of Court. If a settlement results in the payment
of compensation in a case where the government entity would have won
in court, then the public fisc needlessly loses funds that could have been
used to provide additional services or benefits.
Proponents of the damages remedy argue that the deterrence issue
is largely speculative. 95 The Supreme Court has rarely found a land use
regulation unconstitutional. Furthermore, the regulating authority may
not owe compensation for the time during which normal administrative
and judicial delays occur. The First English opinion left this question
unanswered but stated that the questions "that would arise in the case
of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning or-
dinances, variances, and the like" are "quite different." 9 It is unlikely
that the Supreme Court would impose liability on a municipality for
the time during which the Court would refuse to hear the case because
the landowner had not yet exhausted all of his state remedies.
If the Court declines to impose liability for normal delays, then
regulatory authorities will not be deterred from engaging in good faith
regulation of land use. This will encourage regulating authorities to allow
landowners some use of the property during the period of time required
for administrative and judicial consideration of the developer's request.
Since all landowners are required to submit to the process, there are
no investment-backed expectations during the period, other than those
which arise from the use to which the land had previously been put.
If the regulation avoids interfering with all possible uses, then compen-
sation should not be awarded for normal administrative and judicial
delay even if the regulation is ultimately found invalid.
94. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 30-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377-78
(1979). See also Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193, 200-01 (N.D. 1979).
95. Comment, supra note 37, at 730. It is also argued that if the fear is real then
perhaps land use planners are regularly overstepping the constitutional bounds of per-
missible regulation.
96. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
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If interim damages are awarded, they should only be awarded from
the time at which development would have occurred in the absence of
the regulation, which is when the landowner is first harmed. 97 The
determination of when a regulation begins to effect a taking becomes
critical. Under present regulatory takings analysis, this point is not easy
to identify. Damages awarded from the point at which a permit was
sought would be overstated. 9 The landowner would be compensated for
a normal delay that every landowner must face. Developers effected by
a regulation that might be unconstitutional would be encouraged to
immediately apply for a permit in order to maximize any potential
damages award. 99 Normal delays could be called incidents of ownership
and therefore not implicate the takings clause.
If damages are awarded from the point at which the permit is first
denied, then the developer is encouraged to proceed with alternative
development plans that are less profitable while pursuing a regulatory
taking claim. If the regulation is found to be unconstitutional and if
the alternative development is irreversible, then the landowner would
seek compensation for the permanent reduction in profit. This could
result in large damages awards for loss of profits over the life of the
alternative development.'00 Regulating authorities might be forced to
make monthly payments to landowners because unconstitutional regu-
lations caused the landowners to undertake development plans which
generate less profits for the landowner, plans which also produce lower
tax revenues for the municipality. °'
Awarding damages from the point at which all administrative appeals
and requests for variances are denied suffers from the same types of
problems. After exhausting all local procedures, the landowner has an
incentive to proceed with irreversible development plans while pursuing
federal appeals. The potential damages from the time required for the
appeals process may cause landowners to pursue appeals that they oth-
erwise would not pursue. Landowner appeals, even where unsbccessful,
would cause state and local governments to expend funds on legal fees,
funds that could be used in other ways more beneficial to the public.
In addition, if the regulation is invalid then it has essentially effected
a taking from the moment that development would have occurred in
the absence of any regulation. If the regulation prevented the developer
from proceeding with his project, then the developer should be com-
pensated for any and all losses that occurred due to the imposition of
97. Sterk, supra note 90, at 135 n.112.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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the invalid regulation. The courts should make no distinction between
losses suffered prior to the exhaustion of administrative appeals and
remedies and those losses suffered thereafter.
CONCLUSION
The temporary takings remedy does not complement all measures
of regulatory taking. It is most compatible with a violation of the fifth
amendment that deprives an owner or developer of all use of his prop-
erty, because that type of regulatory effect is very similar to the effects
of temporary physical invasion and occupation. The application of the
temporary taking concept to other forms of taking is more complex.
The Supreme Court has never found a taking unless the regulation
has deprived the owner of all economically viable use of his property.
However, state courts have often found a taking where the value of
the property was only diminished. 0 2 The application of the remedy for
temporary takings will be most difficult in situations where the value
of the property is greatly reduced but not completely destroyed.
The holding in First English is based on fundamental constitutional
principles and, as such, it should be applied to all types of regulatory
takings. Therefore, if a landowner is denied permission to construct his
first choice of development but instead mitigates his damages by pro-
ceeding with alternative development plans that are less profitable, then
the courts should calculate damages using a time factor that reflects the
life of the investment pursued. The calculation of compensation should
not make any distinction between takings by deprivation of all beneficial
use for a finite period of time and takings by reduction in value in
perpetuity. If a perpetual reduction in value occurs because of a taking,
then the compensation could be infinite. This is a very disturbing prospect
for any municipality.
The temporary taking concept conflicts with the "bundle of rights"
theory of regulatory taking. Particular property rights can be broken
into time segments. The deprivation of the right during a particular
time segment is merely the loss of one strand in the bundle. A conflict
occurs because the Court has previously stated that it will not look to
the effect on individual segments or strands in the bundle of rights to
determine if a regulation has created a taking. However, the temporary
102. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement
Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Oooley
v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); Aronson v.
Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964); Thornburgh v. Port of Portland,
233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
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taking remedy is analogous to compensation for the destruction of one
strand in the bundle.
First English brings together two concepts that previously were con-
sidered distinct. It applies a form of the physical invasion rule to
regulatory takings and introduces a segment by segment examination of
all affected rights. The opinion declares that compensation for a taking
is an absolute right. The court then limits the First English holding to
a situation where the landowner is deprived of all use of his property.
However, if the right to compensation is absolute, then all temporary
takings must be compensated.
There are serious disadvantages connected with the computation of
temporary damages. Significant problems are evident whether liability
starts at the point when the ordinance is adopted or at the point when
it is enforced. A damages remedy works best when the type of conduct
sought to be deterred is specifically defined. Since the constitutionality
of borderline regulations is highly uncertain, the degree of deterrence
is likewise uncertain. It is very difficult and perhaps unfair to punish
municipalities for erroneous judgment calls made in good faith. We do
not need a temporary taking damages remedy for purposeful delay. Such
delay could be compensated as a violation of procedural due process.'0 3
Bad faith delay should be recognized as a violation of due process, not
a taking of private property. Therefore, the court should narrowly
confine the damages remedy for temporary takings. It should be limited
to cases where the regulation has deprived the landowner of all beneficial
use of his property or created some effect analogous to a physical
invasion and occupation.
Alfred R. Gould, Jr.
103. A damages remedy would be available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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